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ln Hun aı there were fı - ' .I - .- - u -honour btšefã/re 1994 whn äııııııÍı|pty|ıt.~ot Lııııııııal .cases lor tlıe protection
d f _ A » A ay iıcrı. .ut thıee ıııaııı types. the tırst one ll
Tããlëlatılplp, thellsãcond one ıs slander. and tlıe third one is deseemtltm.
0L1 annu e case was the crin ~` -` `ı e ot « detamatıon ot authorıtıes or olllelll
persons >>, which was decla d 2 ' ' ~ - - .1994. re unconstıtutıonal by the Constıtutıonal (otırt itt
As for defamation, according to both th ' ' 4
former Criminal Codes being in effect priof t(ouI2rãl]i'>6CarıiIy1l3tÍis(šıOde| mid iii.wıo, ııı 0
presence of a third Paflyõ 61123868 in the written or oral communication ot' ıtnyfact that is in' rˇo t th ˇh_ . Ju 1 us o e reputatıon of another person, or uses an expression
w ich directly refers to such a fact, ls guılty of defamatiorf As o d
the misdemeanor or the offence of slarıder can be committed bppose m W..
who, a art from th ` - y agy per“""'in_ _ P 6 Case of defamation, << uses a degradıng expressıon (hm ||
Jurıousš to the reputatıon of another person, or commits other act in thl
regard » _ If this is committed a) in connection to the professional acti 't bl .
office or public activity of the victim or b) before the ublic at l vti y, pu ıı
of slander is committed; in any other case the míisdemea argeift e orrom.
considered. In addition, slander can be comniitted by physicziioasfaulilãgdfvrılii
(defamation only exısts in the fenn of crime and not as misdemea F'
desecration is committed by any person whogviolates the memo dlfmd maıbéi
PerS011 by the means defmed in the cases ofdefamation and slancišr a ecu”
As for the crime of defamation the rot '_ z t d l ' `slander, ıs honourw. The Hungarian judicišl priıceteice iišãl mieršst” Slmflafiy. ill
two sides: on the one hand it is considered to be the slellfeeãtee)ıl11ı03i`aS hm/ms” - a person.expressed by the category of dı'gmíz'y` on the othe h d 't '
appreciation and respect by the community for the persâbiı a elxpiãsstieıã
1 . ." Wıth this, the Hungarian re l t' f - .European mainstream AS fãuãıëûlılš :Y0S§;;1nõtãršnotãepcps,tın essärš0e,fdoãs not dıffer fronı th!
criminalizes at least one of these acts. For th E 5 PS ame, - 0 t e 8member sm"za <„.S...„ z J 1 T`:f:*:2::..z1?;;`°:f°:::,aı?g °fon an ınsut inin A. KOLTAY (ea), Cz'>„}' a' zÍ P ` ~ EUf0v°».Budapest Wolters Kluwerâ 251 š'Í7pI;:.248_<Í“š9;ıJı_íetıves On the Fundamental Freedom Of Expresslon.
*A<>ın°c0f2Oı2.
5 The statutory provisions re d` d f ` . .fm mgznfs fm „f„Íi„L?Í„ãz a?1Š`i“ZÍÍ,ÍilŠÃ'ÉZÍ' ii? 'a“"Í“ “'“-"a' *° ““° '"°S°“' °“°'
1880). See the historical evolution of thesdefamatory rules iii Hunšãlrıyeä (ilaigšãemiıiıe effecüvc MÍ - - „<< e Regulationof Criminal Defamation and I lt ' H ~ ,
Šftzzw, 2018, vol. 9, n° 2, Pp.nıS;õ-igi . ungm between 1880 _ 1979 ii' Joumal 0" Empea" ”'”'°'YAct n° IV of 1978.
7 .Accordıng to the new Criminal Code the offend ˇ ' 11 b ` `. . _ „ 1 _ın prıncıple: « The penalty shall be imprisonmeíırtıiıtıiiuelãceıedintgyni/nopryigçíıfttfie1:12?oıliymlr
committed: a) with malice f th h ' ` ' I - _ _ ° amalml ll,„, ;s„:z;t;;r:;`;ı°:f 2322313) tr R*
9 azt 15° c 0f2Oı2, art. 227, § (ı)_ ” ` - § (2))-
an er is punishable símilarly to th fd ` 0 ,10 Fm the possible meanings of heO::1a)slproin elflalrpãtzirtıiıilšatëtrifiaäıfart.227,š(š)).ıce. see . ZOMORA
<< A becsület mint jogi tár Th h - , _ -Orosz, op- cm pp- 24746 I e onour as a protected legal ıntı-.restl », m Menyhárd - Gárdon-
ll0
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category of repııtution. 'I`his ıııeuns thııt lıııııotır is the geııertıl category wlıielı
consists oftwo things: dignity and repııtııtioıı. el hc Violation ot`honouı` may occuı`
either solely in case of Violation ol' digııily or iıı euse of Violation of reputation
alone; however, the judicial practice uims ut oh_ieetil`ying the Violation ofdignity
as, in this case, the main focus does not eoneern the sense of dignity but
the social perception of the decline of self-esteem and its assessment by the
community (hence, the violations of dignity and reputation are getting closer in
practice).
The criminal conduct of defamation is the communication of a fact. Three
forms of comınunication are possible: the assertion (that is, allegation) of a fact,
transmission of a fact (passing on information derived from others), and the use
of an expression directly referring to a fact. The latter (according to Justice of
the Curia (Supreme Court), István Kónya) means « highlighting a characteristic
aspect of a fact (...), from which (...) logically the whole event can be
inferred »“. The asserted fact can be either false or true; in the latter case.
defamation can be established if proving the truth is not permissible, or if it is
permissible, but remains unsuccessful (I will discuss later what proof of truth
implies). It is irrelevant whether the offender knew about the truth or falsehood
of the communicated fact, and whether his/her intentions were in good or bad
faith. However, the communicator of the fact must be aware that the fact he/she
communieates is objectively capable of violating honour. The actual Violation ot`
the victim°s honour as a result, however, is not necessarily a corollary to this
crime (so defamation also occurs if, for example, no one believes the fact
communicated).
The communication of a fact can be carried out not only orally or in writing„
but in any other way as well, such as by depictions. The statement can be
formulated not only in indicative mood, but in conditional mood as well, and
even in the form of a questionu. Defamation may be committed against anyone:
not just a natural person, but also a legal person, because legal persons do not
have dignity, but they do have reputation (goodwill) - based on the Hungarian
practice - which may be protected by the criıninal law. The victim does not have
to be named for the crime to occur, but must be clearly identifiable. Defamation
can only be committed « in the presence of others », which does not mean that
other people should be at the same place where the asseıtion was made; the only
requirement is that a third party be able to become aware of the stated fact' .
If the act (the communication of a fact injurious to honour) is carried out meruly
against the victim, without it being perceivable by a third party, then it can only
be slander.
“ I. KÓNYA (ed.), Magyar büntetőjog. Kommentár a gyakorlat számára [Hungarian pemıl law.
Commentary for the legal practicej, Budapest, HVG-ORAC, 2013, p. 872 (e.g.: « Here come the
stieky fıngers of the company »).
'2 E.g. « Do you still make a living out of prostitution? ».
'3 As a consequence of this, if allegations were made via email, by phone OT in chat, defamation can
be established as well.
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lt was not the Criminal Code ' ' `
' ıq b l ` ` ' \ ' \ . ., 'eeeteie eeeeeeee eee eee ee eeeeieeeeeie_|i:.tlıi.ı.i| priictiece that established thll
c ime even il they correspond to ihg
factual elements of defamation `Thus the statement ofa fact is n '* ot a crime dto the lack of unlawfulness inithe followin ' ' 1 Wg cases: if it was made in order iq
comply with the obligation to re ` `port or the oblıgatıon to bea ` ~'4 ' 'ymade by the parties te judieiel _ e r witness , if it WM
. Proceedings and their attor b ' 9 1theır legal representatives in a ' ' ` neyS° y the ellent” W_ public adminıstration roced ` -matter m the given case Without eeeee _ P ure in a ielcviint
- . _ _ = essaıy msult or re r h'5- '- 'included m a decısıon of an offici l ' p oac ” If H I'. . , ded that ii .. -determmme the feete eveleee 21 provi was necessai y lol'
» ng the evıdence or their l 1 ' '
overall, for the decision-mak' ' ` eg? qua|'fi°*“'°'li
Ordeûiõe the ebjeeeee eeeeieeçgeeggeeuseeegieeleã ieerltaãl reasoning of the coiiçi
and the characterization related to th ' e press ls not a crime 3_ e educatıon of a mino ' ' -The fmdmgs of scientific cultu 1 ˇ ' r IS not a crime eluwr'z , Ft -. ra a ıstıc debates (e.g. a book review) are notconsidered unlawful eith ' - - - ,eehee Pere/le er, even if they objectively vıolate the reputatıon of th!
As for the crime of slander ˇ H ' - _
The first one is slander comiiıiltltıed Ibuygsıtrëiäınllfičiııiilacif fããsfoiíıiglçfs .m.FnncipL"
` . - simi ar to t 0crime of defamation except for th f t ' `the eemm _ e e e _ac that, m thıs case, no one knows aboul
unıca ıon ut the conimunıcator and the vıct th
° - ~ „ fore the i liremaıns in private (almost everythin that ' un e-re - ° mu
defamation is applicable here too g Was prevıously Said m the case Of. , .). The second one is th(either in private er ie eeelie) that ie _ _ _ e use of an expressionmjurious to honour (whi h ' 2
statement of facts but a degradin val ' C IS nm '. . ° dgment hurnˇI' t' ` °demgatery eemlen) ee this ie teeeeãše Ue JU , 1 ia mg qualificatıom
, _ verbal slander>> by the H ' ' '
Practice in a rather misleading wa ' ` -ungananjudmm. _ _ _ y as thıs kind of value dachıeved in wrıtıng or by illustration as ` Ju gment can b.„ ll. The thırd kind f 1 °(or, mgfe peciseiy a behaviour) that is íell/e_ o s ander is an Mi. _ = Jurious to honour (either in ˇpublic). Accordmg to the Hungarian `udi ' 1 - . nl/ataOr in
ziisziziıiıy humiiiaıing J “la l?fa?“°°= the m°°l<1He lmlfafion ofz posture, gesture or mımıc i
In the end the fourth one is the ' ry, e C” are Such exampıa'. = physical slander e sla ` ' ' °thmgs at someone, etc if th ' ° 'g' . pimig” Spmmä Íh1`°W"lÍ- . _ > _ ere 15 11° Pefmafiem PhyS1Cfl1 Injury (because if therıis one the crime m question will be assa 19 ' `” ult - °someone else ie present. ) here, lt is also ırrelevant wheihgf
According to the judícial r t' th - . _ere net punishable, eeee if feelef ecefzee icesieeeeperleeeıng a ien-ere opmion or criticiım
Adopting a merely imm 1 _ y wor e or « tough » manner.Ofa = WŐÖCGHL UHUSUHL lmpolıte conduct is nu!
14le E.g.: Principled Decision of the Supreme Court of Hungary (hereinafter. EBH) 2004 10 l I
E.g.: Case Decision of th th S - ' -
1“E.s.zEH 1991. 338. e C upreme Court °fH“"g“'"y(h°f°*“afi°fÍ BH)2004«267-
” BH 1999. 434.
18 .For the issue ofexem t' fi- ' ` - - - -M. HOLL , peions oni criniınal respensibilıty in defamatoiy cases, see in detail: N. KIS,
AN, B. GELLER, A b
loenethe Criminal Code H. Special fl>';iif01]t0l'9iıÍí3J]fe0si'fyl)(t,:Zlıši)i};kiÍã(Cif)a rész, I Ícommemapy
or example, simple redness on the skin constitiit i ` p'
result of the act, constitutes lt C ˇ ' es -cfiııy Sıandçr (ml) .6445)` while a ÖYUÍSC. M Iassau [ rimınal Case Decision Archive (licicııialier: BJD) 63451.
11')
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considered a crime, such as simple jokc.~i. lciı~iiiıg„ siıiıplc mockery, disrespect,
nor is swearing. cursing., rudencss. obsccnity oi' other expression of anger.
Finally, desecration can be committed by the same conducts as defamation and
slander, and the sanctions are also the same as those in the cases of defamation
and slanderzo. The most significant difference is that the victim in this case is not
actually the deceased person (whose memory, good reputation seems to be
protected by the crime), but those living who are emotionally attached to
the deceased, and his/her social memory is not indifferent to them. According
to the ministerial reasoning of the Criminal Code, the protected legal interest is
« the social appreciation manifested in the memory of the deceased and the sense
of piety of the relatives ». Accordingly, no one can file a private motion against
the perpetrator dishonoring the deceased but the relatives and heirs of the
deceased".
The allegation of a fact thus can be 1) defamation (if a third party was present,
in the sense I mentioned before), 2) slander (if the statement of facts was said in
private) and 3) desecration (if the statement of facts concemed a deceased
person), if this communication objectively violated the dignity or reputation of
the victim. Nevertheless, the offender is not punishable if the stated fact proves
to be true. I-lowever, proving the truth is not permissible in all cases; it is
permissible only if the communication of the fact was justified by the public
interest or the legitimate private interest of anyonen. This criterion implicitly
prohibits the possibility to prove the statement of facts related to the private and
family life if this statement of facts is both indifferent for the public, and
unnecessary for the protection of others” rights. ln the case of ordering - without
a formal decision” - to prove the truth (the failure of which is a substantive
infringement that may lead to the annulment of the judgment24, and the ordering
of which does not depend on the probability of success)25, the burden of proof is
reversedzó. while the general rule resulting from the presumption of innocence is
that the accuser has to prove, in the case of defamatory offenses, the accuser only
has to prove that 1) the statement of facts was made, 2) it was performed by the
accused person, 3) in a wilful manner - after which the defendant has to prove
the truth of their allegation, namely that, regarding its essencen, the assertion is
objectively true (it is not necessary for every small detail to match exactly
the reality, however, substantial deviation is not allowed). Since burden of proof
is on the side of the communicator, if the defendant can not prove the
2° Literally: << Any person who violates the memory of deceased persons by the means defıned in
Section 226 or Section 227 is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable as defined therein » (act n° C of
2012, 2111. 228).
2' Act n° C of20l2, art. 231 § (3).
22 See act n° C of 2012, art. 229 § (2).
23 BH 1992, 2262 BH 1994, 171.
24 BH 2000, 285.
25 EABH 1999, 37.




compliance with reality of the ti .Í . z .
°°mmÍtS defamaÍÍ0fl„ Slander or desbibiratiiiıiiiiiiiiiiiiiiicii iiii iiiiiiiiiiiii iiie piiiisiiii
It is a procedural rule that th ' ° ' -
defamation Or the slander is fˇ;$lëãa?IP0ãäi]tãilıty tã make counterclaims if the
the practice followed in several Europeieiın couiihitiiiiãs iiiy iäiiii paiiiiesi. howeven
case of muwany Cûmmitted defamation accor ing to which, in the
- . _ and l d ' - ,Unpose pumshment IS not possible under Hung;31111 lãiãv the .ludge may avoıd to
Finall , we merel ' - ..desecrašons there arš olãätlălgfaähãäfišncãcıldëëion ttlp defamation, slander and
treatment of vumerable persons ».29 « pmductíolrlll fe current law (<< degrading
Qfa defamatory name »so and «”pubHCatiOn f 0 sound or vıdeo recording
a defamat°1i3”,PafUf9>>ii; as well as the << ínsulii otiiriiitiıiflhioliib/iiigiiizinzliicoiiiiiiiiii iii« msu t 0 `subordinate »°" regulated ainon " `. . g milita .significance of these crimes is negligible. iii Ciiiiieiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiii piiiiciicai
Until 1994, there also existed th ' -
official persons >>, which was howeii/eiiiiiicilibiılaiiiecii iieiiiiiiiiiiiiiii' iii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiis iii
by Decision 11° 36 of 1994 of the Consfitutional Cibiiıiiiiziiiãiiiiiliiiiiiiii iiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiii
the annulment did not have t ' - ` . . e same “mez Sincefor Such acts C _ a re roactıve effect, thıs provısıon had to be ap lied
_ d ommıtted before June 1994 (untıl the early 2000 th ii
ıssue judgments in such cas Th' ` - . S” 9 CÜUŰS
conducts of defamation and slaiiãer if *ihebiieiiiiivbri:iigiiwiiii'ifiˇi iiliiiiiisiieii i-iiii iiiiiiiiiiiii
a state or some local authority (as a le I iii icii ii iiiiiiimiiied against(this crime Was most Oflen C _tt ga lf>efS0H),_ or against the officials of these
the time). The Constitutionibiliiiëbuiiitii iiiiiieibilii`ziiiieciiiiiiiie iiiiiiiiiiiis iiiiiiii iiiiiiiiii Siiiiiiiiig iii
crime contained more severe sanctions th i iiiiiiiiiisiiiiiiiiiiiiii iieciiiisii this
. defamatı (1the same behavıor was ' -iiii On an slander' Namelpunished . . . Y'norms when the victiın was an auitii1ii)iii`iiityie(iiiiiiiSiiiifÍi_i:y.ihe Hunganalf Cflmlflal law
ruled that the criminal law protection of theiiid Íıtatciiiii iiiiiii Ciiiiiiiiuiional Com
persons is not unlawfiil, but it should be propoiíi-tioniãgši iiiiıuihiiiiiiies and °ffi°Íal
expression; and it is disproportionate if the right to iirãee iiigiii ii). freedom °f
expression is more
Šz .lt is therefore not nece f -arises with regard to the lglésigãšfäıtêtšommunicated to prove to be untrue, it is enough if doubt
ii “ ADY Person who exhorts another er iicli _ iieiiiiii .the ie,Vei Ofceriaimy (See BH 540, 1999)-hummate himselfis guilty ofa Crime (P )So_n 3; exploıtilig his vulnerabilily to enãšage in conduct to
gffense » (act C of 2012, art. 225 5 (l))i ii = lnso ar as the act did not result in a more serious criminal
« Any PBYSOU Wh0 Produces aifalsitiied or f- . or d ' - _recording with untrue contents with intent to injušeiitlıãiiiiçiiiid iii iiiiiiiii iiicoiding of 3 S°""d of W160
per5°nS= 15 ŠUÜÍY of a crime (. ..) insofar as th d' g ii iiiiiiiii oi reputatıon Of amthef PefS011 Orgf 2012, art 226/A). z e act id not result in another criminal offense » (act C
ˇ “ Any Person who makes available to the `- . Pub! f l 'f ` - .sound or video recording with untrue contents viriith 'a tiii iiiii iii iiiigiiiii Siiiiiiii iii iiiiiiiio iecoidmg 9r aŠmother person Or persüns is guilty Ofa cfime( ) (in leg tpzinjure the good name or reputation of
2 « Any person who afiroints ` ii iiii 0 012 art- 226/B 5 1_ the authorıty: a) ofa ` i ` i.))' _to hıS>_ H guard or other representatíve of Public authibiiiitiyiiiii iihidilibi`iiitiiiii ii iieisiiii iii ii iiiisiiiiiii Siiiiiiii
gonspicuously gross manner is guilty of a crime( ) » (act C of20i2ii iirtiiiõiiflil iiiëiiiiiii of iiiiiiiiiii iii iii ii
« ny person who insults his subo d' Í - . . . Z ' _ - -gmss manner is guilty Ofa crime » (arıtiëaocš lıišs2:itin4aÃı9d§ig:ı:ı)t)y ııı Iron! ol oilıcrs nı- in a manit`estly
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restricted in case of oflicials than otherwise (namely, if officials are protected by
criminal law to a greater cxtent than others).
In addition Decision n° 36 of i994 of the Constitutional Court also included a
constitutional requirement for the judícial application of the crime of slander,
accordín to which: « the sphere of expression has to be broader in relation to8
persons and institutions who exercise public authority and politicians who act ın
public than as regards other persons. An expression of a value judgement
capable of oflending the honour of an authority, an oflicial person or ci
politician, which was expressed with regard to their public capaciıfy is not
punishable under the Constitution; and an expression directly referring to such a
fact is only punishable if the commıˇssioner (...) knew that the essence of their
t t ment is false or did not know about its falseness because they failed to pays a e .
atterıtion or exercise caution which had been reasonably expected of them.
- 4pursuant to the rules applicable to their profession »3 . Shortly: according to the
' ` ` ˇ ffi ˇ ls orConstitutional Court, slander can not be committed against o cia
politicians in any case by a mere expression of Opinion if such defamatory acts. . . . . I C 1are related to their status of thıs context. By doing so, the Constitutiona oui
virtually made a legislation (according to László Sólyom, president of the
Constitutional Court at the time, « the Constitutional Court wrote into the
Criminal Code »)35, while the literal text of the Criminal Code remained
unchanged. ~
However, the judícial practice did not follow the standards set by the
` f l`t` ` toConstitutional Court. This requirement was clear: the obligation o po 1 ıcıans
endure criticism is greater than that of ordinaiy citizens, and those who criticise
them can not be punished for their defamatory opinions; only the assertions
against them may be punished (and only if the statement is objectively false,
or true, but is not related to the official activity or politician status of the victim).
Neveitheless, the ordinaiy courts confronted the instruction of the Constitutional
C it and the continued to sanction in their practice the excessive, Offensive,ou , y
defamatory opinions and other acts (as if the Constitutional Court had not
detemıined any constitutional requirement). The courts thus actually continued
their practice from before 1994, according to which there is a « defamatory
threshold » or << limit of offense »36 beyond which an Opinion can not go, even in
34 CC Decision n° 36 of 1994 (Vi. 24.), Constitutional Decisions" Archive (hereinafter: AB!-l) I994.
219, operative part l.
i i ii i i i i i li . B Él CÍČS Sólyum35 G. A. TOTH, << A “nehéz eseteknel a b ro erkölcs felfogasa Jut szerep ez esz g
L' zlóval az Alkotmánybíróság elnökével [In “hard cases”, the judge°s moral sense prevails35 ,
Conversation with László Sólyom, President of the Constitutional Court] », Fzmdamentupı, l997
` ` ` ` ` tuall modified» (L. SOLY()Mvol. l, pp. 3l-43. ln addition. « [i]n fact, these crımes were ac y
' ' ` ˇ ˇ ˇ ' ' ' el kö ott« Kölcsönhatás az Emberi Jogok Europaı Biróságanak esetjoga es a szolasszabadság ved me Z
á on [Interaction between the case law of the European Coun of Human Rights and theMagyarorsz g _
protection of the freedom of expression in Hungary] », Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1996-1997, vol. 3-4
p.l70)
' ' ' ˇ' ˇ ló "`a becstlletsértésiés36 See Z. SZOMORA, << Az alkotmányos követelinenyek hivatkozasi tipo gıaj
rágalmazási ügyekben hozott büntetöítéleiekben [Reference typology of constılutional requireıncnts
ˇ ` ˇ ' ˇ ˇ ˇ d l d r cases] », Jogtudományi Közlöny, 20l4. vol. IOin criminal convictıons ın defamation an s an e
pp. 469-476.
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the case of a public ligure oı` nıı olliuiııl ulllıoııglı.. according to the
Constitutional Court, there is no such limit. und politicians must always endure
the diatribes expressed in certain opinions (il` thcsc opprobı`ious expressions
concern their status of polítician and not that of private person).
However, there were two problems with this court practice that remained from
before 1994. One is that the Supreme Court did not set any standard re ardi
8 "Sthese cases whether a particular utterance can be considered an Opinion or a
statem t f f ˇ ˇ ˇen o acts. For thıs reason, ıt was up to the court or m man cases t th, y , o epersonality of the judge whether a particular communication was considered a
statement of facts (that is, defamation) or an abusive ex ˇ f ˇ ˇpressıon o opınıon(that is, slander). The other problem was that there was no standard either to
measure the degree of exaggeration, provocation and reproach_that would make
an o inion ˇ h bl ˇp pımıs a e for slander. For these two reasons, the Judgments of
the courts were inconsistent.
I will discuss only a few specífıc examples. The Supreme CoLu't evaluated as aI 1 . . _ . . _ .awfu expressıon of opmıon the case m whıch a Journalıst wrote b t f
a ou a ar-right polítician that he was « anti-Semitic », as well as << lunatic >>. The court
evaluated as a statement of fact (punishable defamation) the case in which a
critic of a local ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇgovernment pohtıcıan saıd that he was << uneducated >>. It was
considered a lawful expression of Opinion when a joumalist was said to be a
« li r .Th ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇa » e statement according to whıch the vıctım ıs a << real criminal >> w
asconsidered unlawful expression of Opinion, and thus slander It was not
' h blpums a e to read a musician°s poem on the radio, in which the follo ˇ
wıng weresaıd about the dırector at the time of the adminístrative office of Budapest:
<< Or there is the half-witted László Grespik put a ro e aro d hˇ, p un ıs neck, and lethim hang! >> - according to the court, the musician did not commit defamation or
37slander , because a polítician is expected to t l to era e even exaggeration andprovocation°8. S it ˇ ˇ ˇ ˇo seems to be obvıous that the Hungarıan crımmal courts could
not decide where this threshold should be drawn.
In one of the most important criminal procedures in Hungary, it was evaluated
as a statement of facts (and therefore defamation was established h
) W en ajoumalist wrote about the former parliamentary representative Imre Mécs,
a revolutioner sentenced to death after the revolution against the Soviets in 1956,
that he had escaped from death penalty in the end because he had betrayed his
fellows, and that some of them were executed as a result of his betrayal. It is
interesting that this was the only judgment after the political transformatˇ
ıonof 1990 in which the offender (not the journalist himself, but the editor-in-chief
f tho e newspaper, András Bencsik) was sentenced to enforceable im ris, p onment
(however, this was modified later to suspended imprísonment in the second
fe See Case Decision of the third instance of the Court of Appeal of Budapest Bhar 200/2008/5
JS By the Wa the sy, ame tmcertainty also occurred in civil law matters. Some examples from lawsuits
for th ˇ ˇ ` ˇe protection of personalıty are. The followıng statements were found to be lawful by the courts:
<< liar », << fraudulent », « soulless », « traitor »; but « 'I ˇ_ evı person wıth AIDS », « paranoid »,
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instance., and the Supreme t`ouı1 ullınıately reduttäi rjllferä-:SÍ*`3t'|Et was made in Ü
eeee eeeelelelee ˇtetet eıtieheeıeeteiiieıeeineãheeefewivas not able to prove the truth olˇmatter of pu ıc ın eres „
this euegeeeeeeˇ - ~ ˇ ˇcial racticc was
Regafdlng the defamatmey expeeeeıeeä eee eeäiltieetoteleejëeehstitueionaI Court.
even mere uneteele' Ae I eeve eeeeeeee e eeeeerate eeproach in all cases (ııı1I@_\-.t.
eeeeeieee ez?e eeeäleeiãlıeãeehãeeefeıeetseıefiheabee core of human dÍ8"Íf)”)ee~ :W Tethe fˇeproae We” V. - iatribe threshold >>„ Í U5 nc
judícial Practice considered the egcıstenfsevgãã atãllanv punished by Hungarian
SŰYÍÜUSIY Offensive epieˇeee ee' eee eel ractice was aludgement from `ee`ee`
courts. The base decısıon of thıs JP 101% P adin vimperative or 0pprOb|.im,_„
according to whichzı << Bısparaãënämnãšf dignããy made against authoritics Or
erences which serıouSY V10. . ' ` - constitutc llw
eefiCÍa1S _ 35 3 result ee the eeeˇeˇee ee teelceeeeeleıeveflteıellëeeehlie motion ». Laıtcr
crime of slander at most, whıch ıS Punıshab e a Seeing it as a quaSi_preccdL_m'
the erimˇnel eeeee elweye eeeeeee ee eee(e<eıei'eehiıt merely 21 Provincia! court ol'
theueeıze Šveeheet elleeeıve/eveeere teheigeleleëietice was also aPPÍˇ°V°d by thebf'ˇˇı|:ˇeıˇı.ˇ|eeal.nte6l1z ”. . ' risesta isctl-
eleıeırt in 2001 when itdeclared _ın a cšaäe. << ŠÜÉTCÉÉÉÉÉÉŠŠÉÉŠČ, pamamcnwy
in relation to the official operation offt Íhm ãlefendant uses expressions mm W
representative) as_a Private plaıntı ,_ Él rights related to the expression U1.
beyond the exercıse of the consltıÍU,?02 of which is expected of public fˇıgurcs
eeeeeee eeeeeedteetee'tel1eeeieeeeãh: ezieıeııcleivhich are ÍHÍUFÍÜUS to the human eˇeeeyand politicians ue o z
and reputation of the victim »ˇˇe.
` his- courts regardıng where
Hewever” there were eeeet eleeeeeeıetehee eíeienãegfslander was established ın aborder should ılše drawn.fFoitãëlããJnt „that contained that the insulted policeman
concrete case ecause o a
. f ct lawfully for defamatory crintcs '-
39 Otherwise. in Hungary, no Prıson sentence was everAer;toiT;2B0r Germany* Where thıs Someumcs
as 0 pgged for example, to the practıces from ltalY„ U S typicaı is fine, but even more the
hapleens Bven suSP6nded imprísonment IS _mSufitfhlãããé committed the crime) implizg in
- ˇ ` ' ddition to the esta ıs mg 0pmeaeen' whˇee ee e ' 'n the sentence. . _ . ,
Hllflgfifiafl law the pestpeeemeet ee eeeëel eititional Court ruled that ideal!/500310" Ofpeˇeenˇˇ (ˇ eeeAu Fm, example, in an electıon case, the °“S , Qfzhefimdanıenral rights ofthese pcrS0"-\-
Oliticians) with animals inffinges the unrestrıctable coıre _ S in 2014 a Candidate Wanted to have u
en this case during the campaign of the parlıamentalˇY if ecllãll h he dépicfed two prime ministcraı
TV comllflelly broadcast a Political advertısement láln lçaëcmonkeys More preciselyq in um ~|-V
(his Political rivals: Viktor Orbán and Fefene Gyeeee 'eistcrs raPPÍÜg and dancing while ˇˇˇˇˇˇee e
spot a monkey hangs on the voice of the two prıme min cted ,to mm the candidaws request; „nd” . ' he TV company T919 _ . Q ,fi „-41 f bananas around hım. T . d the gupı-eme „ot .
ieiee ieliie eejection was qualified bY both the eˇeetˇee eeteıãegieãše te: clecision of the Supreme
leëiúmate The eeeeˇeete eemee te the Ceeeeeldleeel Cieenot eınconstitutional as the identi'l`ıcı-nloııˇ ` ' Court held that tlııs ecısıon . _ -Court, but the Constitutional _ CC Decısıon 3l22 ot 2014._ . the persons concemed. S66of humans with anımals dehumamS6S
(IV. 24.), Reasoning, [17]-
4ˇ BH 1995, Ő-
” Baranya Counfy Court-
” BH 2001, 99.
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was a « conımunist hireling. hench S ' . . .. . .case the expression of « asshole \í(().ılıíı.-.t.ııd >>H. whılıe ın anotlıer
the court did not find the expression of« C0 .k . mi 1.16 Simıe resliifi .ˇ However'
insulted mayor was « corrupt >> deıfamatoıy-ai; Sfiıc el Po|ıceıı|11an>> , nor that the
for a 10118 time with this inc - ` quwever* "ot mg C0UlCl be doneoh t ı O ı .constitutional Court had no poãfãlti íodgägfııt .ludıcıal Practice, because the
víolated the constitutional requirements it had! seztorflghçte Judıãıal decıslons that
when the so-called << real constitutio " ls wast e case um" 2012. 1121 C0mplamt»48 ' - 'Hungarian legal system which m ' ` was mtmduced Into the„ ade it possıble for intthe Constitutional Court not on ' erested people to mm t°l - - .unconstitutional judícial applicatioii ãtglalilõi (iıliãilngclloliallÍWSÍ but agamst
vı ua Ju ıcia decisions aswell49. This enabled the Co t`t t' . . .judícial practice. ns 1 u ıonal Court to controlJudicıal decisions and the
44 'AVO (State Protectio D - .fommunist regime' Ü epartment of the Hungarian State Police) was the secret service of the
5 Case Decision of the third in46 _ _ _ _ stance of the Court ofAppeal f S d
47 Case Decision of the thırd instance of the Court ofAppeal ãfP%egeB,hBhar'L103/2012/4"
48 Case Decısıon of the third instance of the Court ofAppeal f Bartis, annıgg/2011/7'
For the real Constitutional Com . . _ 0 U aPeSÍ, 5.Bhar.2l3/2008/12, . Plfllflt. Se dtal: . f- . 'Alkotmanyban és az Alaptöwényben (He ıpésze) Em] TOTH, << Az egyeni (alapljogvédelem az
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary al-ld the F Š rotectıon of (Fundamental) Rights in the
Közjogı. Szemle, 2012, VOL 3, 2012 V0' 4 lıínlamental Law of Hungary (Partl and II.)] »i
compëfencies and Practice of the CoiıstitutioiıâpCour-t ieand 2.9-37' For certain parts Üf the UÜW
ÍC°"S“f“ff°flfll Court] ». i„ L. TRocsÁNYi E sciiAriDÍÁg" zl BALOGH: “ A'k°"“á“YbÍfŐSá§[Introduction to constitutional law] Budapest .HVG ORAC (;ãl.2), Bevezetes az alkatmányjogba
« sajátos aıkoimánybiiaskoaási m Sd ıı ı< ° - ' ” ' pp' 343374? C- CSERVAK
Jog?/,nézefi Szemle, 2015, vol. 3., :Pf É9_6ëSPã:ıfic Mãőlels. of Constitutional Jurísdicti0n]»,
Šaflýszagagság [Freedom of Speech and preSs]„» ipl. LPP-CSn`}<I5<2,(eJá )T.Aä(3`Vf§CS, «[Vélemény- és
GW „ i ll apest, Novissi 2014 _ _ " ` _' -, __ 0.man,1y'Og Constitut' lkézikönyve [Handb k ma, z pp. 54, B. BITSREY, B. TÖROK, Az alkotmá 'O ˇ mm
A TÉGLÁS Oo of the constitutional complaintj Budapest HVG ORAC 2"” gi panasz
- I, « The Protection of Fundam tal R' Í - ° ` = 015, 290 Il;
COM of Hungary Afier the New Fundamelíäl Laviiglšlãtäl élte Jurısprudence of the Constitutional
F. MANDAK, Z. FEJES (eds.), Challenges and Pirfazls É šzto Force in 2012 », in Z. SZENTE,
D@V@Í0Pmem`.` Discussing the New Funda I » m e Reçent H“"ga*ÍŰ" C0"SÍÍfw'i0na149 . _ _ menta Lan OfHanga pm. L,I Interestıngly, the ıntroductıon of the constitutional complainıtya ˇ 'Si Haimattan, 2015'
a ready occurred during the chan ' agams « rea » COUŰ jud mem ll86 Of F6511116. however due to the resistance o g S as` > f the Supreme Cgunand the indifference of the O ' 'pposıtion Roundtable as th ' - .Omnes procedure that makes it possible for eve One(t0 iniõãfaâogsıgãtrãd the ıntroductıon of the erga
ıorthatofflz.-;«rea1;,consmmíonaı Com . .ry P abstractnorm cont l h. ızii i ii _ . . f° f anlegal protection), it was eventually Femgveil liíiiıiıiıvoillıld sen/e as the meaiıs (if the mdmdual /hasi”
Introduction of Sólyom László p 19 in G HALMAIC ägenda of constitutional issues. (see: The
[Hz„„iz„ fighisj, Budapest. Osiris 2063 mi 13-20) Áfiffzff -no. gã. ToT_H (ada), E„zızz„-jagak
constitutional complaint was raised from, ti i t ˇ . ls, e I ea of mtmducino the “ real ”. _ t . . =Pts Pmsldem Who formulated at the begímtëãgoo most recently by the Constitutional Court and
msmution that Would pmtect individual le al _ h constitutional process the need to ensure an
Possibiliíy of Posterior abstract nonn controlg~ thug tli _ C0n'cur`remly “mh the abomion of the
constituted the « real » constitutional complaint(foiıãštaã|§(;2ãilã~u13,0;:;lt bodifttwolgd be the One thai
~ er wrı en y Paczolay Péterthe president of the Constitution_ , al Court addressed to S I ' f ” *commıssıon found d f ` .af-1m°"= La5Zl0„ the president f6 or the elaboratıon of the Constıtutıon on Se iii 0 the
http://wwwparlament.hu/bíz/aeb/inf /ab df ' ` ° member the 29 20103
promoted by several other constitutirgnal Jerílie mtiroqucnon of thıs legal i"Stit“Ü°n Was 21150
°0mPl3ÍÜÍ" Present and fiiture? >> Bírák L:rvy` lããe of instance: Ü- HALMAI. « The constitutional
Content of Constitutional Jurisdiction » gi?/rgotıızáiııjıfiı/ıfiırivjiâil :iii_50i!(l`l.|KO`/IÁCS, « Essential
" ` ^*“' *~'~ ~ V0- I. pp. 93-99;
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'l`he first such decision made in ti cim- olˇcıiıııiııiıl deliııııtilion was brought in
April 20l4S". In this case. the ordinury coııı'l huıfl l.o ınuke ti decision in a public
debate from a small town (Siklós) The dehute was between the mayor and one
l` tl e it oing on for years by the time;of the municipal representatives o` fi c y. g
as one of its stations the local represenlative stated the following: « While they
` h of tax ayers on themselves anddo not feel sorry about spendıng t e money ip
mana e it as if it was theirs, the (...) town adminıstration (...) came up with aB
drastic austerity package (...)». According to the court of first instance".
the statement that they manage the money of the city as if it was theirs was an
ex ression which directly referred to a fact, based on which the representatıveP
essentially accused the mayor of embezzling the money of the town. However.
he could not prove this, thus he committed the crime of defamation. and
therefore the court sentenced the offender to a fine. The court of second instance
agreed with the court of first instance and upheld its decisionsz.
The convict turned to the Constitutional Court, and the Constitutional Court
fotmd that the courts víolated the local representative”s right to freedom ol`
expression. The statement was made in a matter of public interest (ıt was about
the criticism of the wealth management of the local government), and the
ˇ ` ` ` t r obli ation ol'addressee of thıs statement was a politician, who has a grea e g
enduring criticism, and who has to tolerate indefinitely the opinions even if these
opinions are intensified or Offensive. According to the Constitutional Court.
the text did not actually contain any factual statement, only a very negative Value
` d t and eve one should have the right to this agamst a polıtıcıan.Ju gmen , ry
otherwíse the free, fearless public debate would be impossible (here, the
Constitutional Court explicitly refers to the practice of the European Court ol'
Human Rights, and the danger of the « chilling effect >> within it53).
Finall in this case, the Constitutional Court also defined in principle theyi
aspects that have to be examined by ordinary courts in cases of defamation.
According to these, it is first necessary to decide whether a given statement was
ˇ ` ˇ f t almade in a public debate; and if so, then secondly, whether ıt was a ac u
statement or only a value judgment (the latter is not constıtutıonally
punishable)54. Thus, this decision of the Constitutional Court provided aspects
applicable for the courtsss, moreover, the Constitutional Court clearly stated that.
 
lvl. BIHARI, << Mihály: Constitutional Court and Constitutional Jurisdiction », Magyar Jog, 1999,
vol. 4, pp. 200-214, esp. p. 212.
5** cc Decision ii° 13 0f2Oı4 (iv. 18.)
5' District Court of Siklós, 4.B.85/2012/16.
52 Regional Court of Pécs, 4.Bf.276/2013/7.
53 CC Decision n° 13 of20l4. (IV. 18.), Reasoning, [30].
5"* The difference between the two is that << as opposed to Value judgments, the statements ol' facts
always contain concrete facts the reality of which can be justified and verified by proof »
(CC Decision n° 13 of 2014 . IV. 18.), Reasoning, [4l]_).
55 This decision followed the 4“' amendment of the Fundaniental Law of Hungary of 20l3 which
` t' with the following text' « The right to freedom of expression may not beamended the constıtu ıon . V
exercised with the aim of violating the human dignity of others » (Art. IX par. (4) of the Fundaıııcııtal
' ˇ ˇ ' ˇ ' d an realLaw). However, according to the Constitutional Court, thıs modificatıorı dıd not cause y
change in the constitutional approach to the contradıctıon between the right to dıgmty and the right to
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in the future, it will exercise its new compeıeııce l`or annulling those ordinary
judícial decisions that are contrary to the constitutional criteria. Furthermorl.
Decision n° 13 of 2014 of the Constitutional Court included another important
mnovatıon: instead of public figure it placed public qjýair in the center of
constitutional examirıation, thus the focus shifted from subjectice aspects to
objective ones; so it is no longer important whether the criticized person
ıs generally a public figure (e.g. a polítician), but instead whether the statement
is made in relation to a public affairsõ.
Thus, the Constitutional Court applies certain elements of the criteriıı
elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights for the judgments of
ordinary courts” and it expects the implementation of this fiom the Hungarian
courts since 2014. Since then, there has been only one criminal case in which the
courts deviated from the constitutional requirements: in this case, a private
individual criticized the local notary in a Facebook post, classified her as a
« clan » member, claimíng that the notaıy is << racist>> and discriminates the
Roma. This was considered a crime (partly defamation and partly slander) by the
court of first instance, the coLu`t of second instance, and the Supreme Court, as
well, however, according to the Constitutional Court, the ordinary courts
víolated the defendant”s right to freedom of expression, thus it declared these
judgements Lmconstitutionalss. However, beyond this one case, since 2014, there
has been no criminal case in which the conflict between the right to fi`eedom of
expression and the right to human dignity would have been judged by the
ordinary courts in a way contrary to the constitutional críteria” - and in the light
of the current judícial practice we can expect that this will remain in the future as
well.
, , _ _ T , , 4;freedom of expression. (see A. TÉGLÁSI, << András: Véleményszabadság vs. emberi méltóság ~ Egy
rejtélyes alaptörvény-módosítás nyomában [Freedom of speech vs. human dignity -In the trace of a
mysterious constitutional amendment] », Acta Humana, 2015, vol. 6, pp. 25-47.
56 See also CC Decision n° 28 of2014 (IX. 29); CC Decision n° 31 of2014 (X. 9).
57 For these criteria and the practice of the ECtHR related to defamatory cases, see in detail: Z. J.
TÓTH, « A defamatorikus deliktumokkal kapcsolatos részes állami büntetöblróságí döntések
megítélése a strasbourgi bíróság gyakorlatában. [Judgement of the decisions of the Member States'
criminal courts concerning defamatory cases in the practice of the European Court of Human
Rights] », in A. KOLTAY, B. TÖRÖK (eds.), Sajtószabaaiság és médiajog a 21. század elején 4
[Freedom of the press and media law at the beginning of the 21” centuıyj, Budapest, Wolters
Kluwer, 2017, pp. 309-423.
5” cc Decision n° 3263 0f2O18 (vu. 20.).
59 However, this claim is not true for the cases conceming the protection of the likeness of police
officers. In the course if this, the Constitutional Court had to repeal several ordinary courts” decisions
since some of those favoured the personality rights of police officers over the freedom of the press -
in opposition to the constitutional requirement set up by the Constitutional Court (for more details,
see, e.g.: J. Z. TÓTH, « Rendőrképmás: sajtószabadság és képmáshoz való jog a polgári jogi és az
alapjogi jogosultságok keresztútján. [Likeness of police ofiicers: Freedom of the press and the right
to facial likeness at the crossroad of civil and fundamental rights] », Pro Futuro, 2017. vol. 2.,
pp. 110-128; E. ORBAN, « A (rendőr)képmas és kerete: az alkotmánybírósági határozatok helye a
jogrendszerben. [The facial likeness of police offıcers and its fiamework: the place of the decisions
of the Constitutional Court in the legal system] », Jog Állam Politika. 20| 8. vol. 2, pp. 4l-58.
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